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C
entral banks throughout the world are
moving to adopt long-run price stability
as their primary goal. Whether operating
with multiple short-run goals or legislative man-
dates for price stability, virtually all central banks
have recognized the desirability of achieving price
stability over time. Countries with moderate to
high inflation are adopting policies to reduce
inflation, and countries with low inflation are
adopting policies to achieve and maintain price
stability.
To better understand how central banks can
best reduce inflation and what policies and op-
erating procedures should be implemented to
maintain price stability, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City sponsored a symposium
entitled “Achieving Price Stability,” held at
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on August 29-31,
1996. The symposium brought together a distin-
guished group of central bankers, academics,
and financial market representatives. Partici-
pants at the symposium agreed that low or zero
inflation is the appropriate long-run goal for
monetary policy. They disagreed, however,
about whether a little inflation should be toler-
ated and what strategies should be adopted to
achieve and maintain price stability.
I. DEFINING PRICE STABILITY
Symposium participants accepted Paul Vol-
cker’s and Alan Greenspan’s conceptual defini-
tion that price stability obtains when people do
not consider inflation a factor in their decisions.
Participants disagreed, however, about opera-
tional definitions of price stability. While a wide
range of people advocated price stability as the
primary long-run goal of monetary policy, they
interpreted the term price stability differently. 
Stanley Fischer suggested the long-run goal of
monetary policy should be defined as inflation
of about 2 percent, on average, with a range of
1 to 3 percent per year.
1 One  reason he felt the
goal should be a low, positive inflation rate is
that measured inflation overstates actual infla-
tion. This view was widely accepted. As Alan
Greenspan emphasized in opening comments at
the symposium, the mismeasurement of infla-
tion results, in part, from inadequately account-
ing for improvements in the quality of goods and
services over time.
2 Mismeasurement also re-
sults from an inability to account for the contin-
ual introduction of new goods and services,
especially those produced from “intellectual in-
sight, as distinct from physical effort.”  Esti-
mates of the upward bias in the consumer price
index range from about 1¤2 percent to 2 percent George A. Kahn is an assistant vice president and econo-
mist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.in the United States and average about 1¤2 per-
cent in Canada and the United Kingdom (Fis-
cher, Freedman). Another reason given for
targeting a low, but positive, inflation rate is that
a little inflation might “grease the wheels” of the
economy and monetary policy. Fischer and
Lawrence Summers emphasized two ways a
little inflation might have lubricating properties.
First, they said a little inflation would allow
employers to lower real wages without cutting
nominal wages.
3 The premise of the argument is
that nominal wages are downwardly rigid. And,
without a mechanism for lowering real wages in
times of economic stress, employers would have
to resort to laying off workers.
Second, Fischer and Summers said a little
inflation lubricates monetary policy by mak-
ing it possible for central banks to occasionally
engineer negative real interest rates. Negative
real rates, it is argued, are sometimes helpful in
stimulating an economy out of recession. With
positive inflation, central banks can push short-
term nominal interest rates below the rate of
inflation. Such a policy action would be impos-
sible without some inflation since nominal interest
rates cannot fall below zero. This argument has
gained relevance in light of the recent recession
in Japan, where historically low nominal interest
rates appeared inadequate to foster economic
recovery in the presence of zero or negative
inflation.
Many participants at the symposium disagreed
with the view that a little inflation greases the
wheels of the economy. Some participants
thought the evidence on nominal wage rigid-
ity—which comes largely from historical data
drawn from periods of moderate inflation—did
not necessarily apply to a prospective environ-
ment of price stability. Such evidence was at best
considered inconclusive (Feldstein, Freedman).
In addition, many participants thought the nega-
tive real interest rate argument ignored the
influence of monetary policy on other asset val-
ues, such as equity prices and the exchange rate
(Feldstein). Moreover, they attributed the prob-
lems in Japan, not to a lack of monetary policy
potency, but rather to the delayed actions of the
Bank of Japan in lowering rates (McCallum).
Another issue discussed at the symposium
was whether price stability should be defined in
terms of the inflation rate or as a path for the
level of prices. Under the first definition, a shock
to the inflation rate would be followed by a
gradual return of inflation to the rate associated
with price stability. In the process, the price
level would drift randomly over time. Under the
second definition, a shock to the inflation rate
would force the central bank to move inflation,
for a period of time, above or below the level
associated with price stability (and in some cases
causing actual deflation). As a result, the price
level would eventually return to its original path.
The advantage of such a pre-determined path for
the price level is that it would reduce uncertainty
about the level of prices far into the future. The
disadvantage, according to conventional wis-
dom, is that it would require greater variability
in the inflation rate, with central banks having
to offset positive shocks to inflation with nega-
tive shocks and vice versa (Fischer, Mullins).
Most participants at the symposium thought
price stability should be defined in terms of the
inflation rate, not the price level. However, Lars
Svensson put forward a technical argument sug-
gesting that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
achieving a pre-determined path for the price
level could result in lower inflation variability.
Some symposium participants were skeptical
about the validity of this result in practice. Most
participants felt that, at least for now, monetary
policy should be aimed at achieving a low and
stable inflation rate. Later, after further research,
central bankers could reconsider the benefits
and costs of stabilizing the price level.
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Given that inflation in many countries is
above the rate consistent with both conceptual
and practical definitions of price stability, a key
topic at the symposium was how central banks
should reduce inflation. Following a discussion
of conceptual issues, central bankers who had
successfully reduced inflation in their countries
described their experiences.
Symposium participants agreed reducing
inflation was desirable because “inflation is
economically and socially costly” (Fischer).
One major cost is the uncertainty inflation cre-
ates about future prices. Another cost stems
from the interaction of inflation with the tax
code. For example, looking at the interaction of
capital income tax rules and inflation, Martin
Feldstein concluded the economic costs of infla-
tion in the United States were surprisingly large.
Specifically, he estimated the annual cost of an
inflation rate of 2 percent rather than zero was 1
percent of GDP. Thus, permanently lowering
inflation by two percentage points would gener-
ate an extra 1 percent of GDP each year. While
not everyone agreed with Feldstein’s surpris-
ingly large estimates, everyone did agree there
were significant benefits from reducing infla-
tion and, therefore, inflation should be reduced
over time. 
With the desirability of reducing inflation
clearly established, Mervyn King provided a
conceptual framework for analyzing how cen-
tral banks should reduce inflation over time. In
particular, he examined how fast central banks
should reduce inflation and how accommodat-
ing they should be in response to temporary
economic shocks. He argued the best policy
would combine explicit inflation targets with a
discretionary approach to economic shocks. On
the issue of the speed of disinflation, King
advocated a gradual timetable, with inflation
targets consistently set below the public’s infla-
tion expectations and steadily falling. On the
issue of the appropriate response to shocks, King
recommended that central banks at least par-
tially accommodate temporary inflation shocks
such as those stemming from increases in food
and energy prices. However, he also suggested
that until central banks establish their inflation
fighting credibility in the eyes of the public, they
need to be particularly cautious in accommodat-
ing shocks, especially at the beginning of the
disinflationary process.
Throughout his discussion, King emphasized
the role of learning by central banks and the
public. Monetary policy procedures evolve over
time as central banks learn, and the public’s
expectations about monetary policy change only
gradually.
4 It is therefore important for central
banks to communicate what they learn to the
public and for disinflationary policies to be trans-
parent. Policymakers should make clear through
their public statements and their actions what
their inflation objective is, how they will respond
to temporary shocks, and how they think the
economy behaves.
The approach to disinflation that King advo-
cated is a deliberate one, under which policy-
makers would try to make steady progress, year
by year, toward price stability. An alternative
approach is an opportunistic strategy, under which
policymakers would try to keep an already low
inflation rate low while waiting for an unex-
pected recession or favorable supply shock to
ratchet the inflation rate down over time. Donald
Kohn argued that an opportunistic strategy might
enable central banks to reach price stability with-
out deliberately slowing economic growth or
reducing the level of economic activity. While
Kohn said opportunistic disinflation was a strat-
egy worth considering, he emphasized it was not
the official policy of the Federal Reserve. King
had reservations about the opportunistic strategy.
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interpreted as targeting an unemployment rate
below the rate consistent with stable inflation.
As a result, such a policy might reduce central
bank credibility and thereby increase the output
loss associated with disinflation. Other partici-
pants at the symposium (Freedman, Svensson)
also had reservations about opportunistic disin-
flation, and the issue was left unresolved.
5
Turning to the unique problems associated
with a legacy of high inflation, Rudiger Dorn-
busch examined how countries with high infla-
tion could best move toward price stability. He
divided the problem into two parts—how to get
out of extreme inflation (over 15 percent per
month) and how to reduce moderate inflation
(15 percent or less per year). To reduce extreme
inflation, he recommended a complete change
of regime, in which the government budget could
not be financed by the central bank and in which
the central bank would tie its currency to that of
another country. Better yet, Dornbusch suggested,
countries with extreme inflation should simply
replace their local currency with that of a neigh-
boring country with low and stable inflation,
such as the United States or Germany.
 To reduce moderate inflation, Dornbusch rec-
ommended the effort be viewed as one of several
economic problems to be solved, and that a time
frame of five or more years be adopted. For
countries with a legacy of high inflation, too
zealous an approach to reducing a moderate
inflation risks “super-high” real interest rates, an
overvalued currency, severe recession, and bank-
ing system problems. While concern for reduc-
ing moderate inflation is clearly appropriate, it
must be balanced with a concern for economic
growth.
Following the discussion of conceptual issues
involved in reducing inflation, a panel of three
central bankers discussed how they had reduced
inflation in their countries. Donald Brash empha-
sized the comprehensive nature of reform in
New Zealand and the use of explicit inflation
targets to reduce inflation. Jacob Frenkel described
the role of the exchange rate against the dollar
in Israel’s transition to moderate inflation and
the use of inflation targets as a transparent guide
to low inflation. Finally, Josef Tosovsky reviewed
the Czech Republic’s rapid transition from a
command economy to a market-oriented econ-
omy in which the nominal exchange rate was
used as the anchor for stabilization policy.
At a luncheon address, Domingo Cavallo con-
tinued the discussion of practical experiences by
describing the approach used in Argentina.
Among other reforms, Argentina put in place a
new monetary system which transformed the
central bank into a virtual currency board. As
such, the central bank permitted holders of pesos
to exchange, at any time, one peso for one U.S.
dollar. At the same time, all indexation clauses
were prohibited. The results were striking. Infla-
tion fell from 1,344 percent in 1990 to 1.6 per-
cent in 1995 and to 0 percent from June 1995 to
June 1996. 
III.MAINTAINING PRICE STABILITY 
After considering conceptual and practical
issues in reducing inflation, the discussion
turned to strategies for maintaining price stabil-
ity. A variety of strategies were proposed, but all
shared at least one common feature. All the
strategies allowed monetary policy some capac-
ity to accommodate shocks while still maintain-
ing long-run price stability.
John Taylor began the discussion by review-
ing various explanations for why price stability
had not been maintained in the past. In his view,
the most compelling explanation was the rise of
economic theories in the 1960s suggesting a
long-run tradeoff between inflation and output.
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policymakers to pursue monetary policies biased
toward higher inflation. When combined with
unrealistically low estimates of the “full-employ-
ment unemployment rate” and energy price
shocks, these policies inevitably produced higher
inflation. Only after the economics profession
began incorporating more realistic theories of
expectations formation into models of inflation
did policymakers move toward lowering and
stabilizing inflation. The superior performance
of the U.S. economy since the early 1980s has
made it clear, in retrospect, that disinflation was
the correct policy to pursue after the inflationary
1970s. 
Looking to the future, specifically at policies
for maintaining price stability once it has been
achieved, Taylor advocated the flexible use of a
policy rule. In particular, he recommended a rule
incorporating a short-run tradeoff between
inflation and output but not a long-run tradeoff.
Taylor’s preferred rule, which sets (along with
various other parameters) a long-run target for
inflation consistent with price stability, would
guide policymakers in adjusting short-term in-
terest rates in response to deviations of real GDP
from potential and inflation from target.
6 Thus,
if an output shock raised real GDP above poten-
tial, policymakers would raise short-term inter-
est rates. Likewise, if inflation came in above
target, policymakers would raise rates. While
the rule would allow policymakers to counter
adverse short-run shocks to supply and demand,
adherence to the rule would nevertheless main-
tain long-run price stability.
In commenting on Taylor’s presentation, David
Mullins disagreed somewhat with Taylor’s view
on what went wrong in the 1970s, but generally
agreed with Taylor on how to respond to shocks
once price stability has been achieved. Arguing
that the economics profession had less influence
on policy than Taylor asserted, Mullins put rela-
tively less weight on misguided economic the-
ory and relatively more weight on adverse price
shocks in explaining why price stability had not
been maintained in the past. On the broader issue
of how monetary policy should respond to
shocks, Mullins emphasized the need to stay
focused on the long-run goal of maintaining
price stability.
Turning to monetary policy implementation,
Charles Freedman reviewed from a practitioner’s
perspective a wide range of issues involved in
maintaining price stability. Within the frame-
work of explicit inflation targets, Freedman
described (among other things) the role of inflation
forecasts in conducting policy, the appropriate
response of policy instruments to changes in
forecast inflation, and the importance of transpar-
ency and communication. Central to his analysis
were the effect central bank credibility has on
the response of financial markets and inflation
expectations to monetary policy actions, and the
effect that monetary policy actions have on cen-
tral bank credibility. The more credible the central
bank’s commitment is to price stability, the more
flexible monetary policy can be in responding to
shocks.
In responding to a deviation of inflation from
target, monetary policy actions that return infla-
tion quickly to target build credibility. However,
they might also lead to undesirable volatility in
output, interest rates, and exchange rates. A more
gradual return of inflation to target smooths fluc-
tuations in output and financial market variables
but risks damaging central bank credibility and
entrenching inflation expectations. Freedman
said that empirical studies for Canada suggested
the optimal time horizon for returning inflation
to target was six to eight quarters. To minimize
any harmful effects on credibility of such a
gradual approach, the Bank of Canada has
explicitly explained the approach in its state-
ments to the public.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · FOURTH QUARTER 1996 57In commenting on Freedman’s paper, Otmar
Issing and Donald Kohn both expressed reser-
vations about the use of explicit inflation targets.
Issing argued that having a commitment to price
stability and announcing a low inflation target
were not enough to anchor inflation expecta-
tions. Rather, the central bank needs to disclose
its policy procedures to the public and assure the
public that these procedures are capable of main-
taining price stability over the long run. Given
lags between monetary policy actions and their
effects on the economy, intermediate indicators
serve as necessary signals of inflationary pres-
sures. While inflation forecasts can serve as one
such indicator, Issing thought they should be
supplemented with other indicators, including,
most importantly, monetary aggregates. In addi-
tion, he said, the use of monetary aggregates as
intermediate targets for policy increases mone-
tary policy transparency and helps define the
responsibilities of the central bank as distinct
from institutions responsible for fiscal or wage
policy.
7
Kohn took a slightly different tack, suggesting
that inflation targets could limit a central bank’s
flexibility in responding to shocks. For example,
inflation targets that tie monetary policy to a
timetable for achieving a specific inflation out-
come might prevent a central bank, which is
otherwise committed to maintaining price sta-
bility, from responding to unexpected develop-
ments. For example, inflation targets could be
inconsistent with a Taylor-type rule in which the
central bank’s commitment to price stability is
explicit, but the time frame over which price
stability is maintained depends on economic
circumstances. In the United States, consider-
able flexibility has been retained in determining
the time frame for achieving price stability. As
Kohn stated, “long-run discipline on monetary
policy has been provided not by numerical tar-
gets but the firm focus of an independent central
bank on reducing inflation over the long run, so
as to eventually reach price stability—as speci-
fied in the Federal Reserve Act.”
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The symposium concluded with comments
from three overview panelists. Andrew Crockett
questioned when and whether central banks
would take the final step to move from moderate
inflation to price stability. He noted that most
central banks are not fully satisfied with current
inflation yet appear unprepared to pay the price,
in terms of lost output, of moving deliberately
toward price stability. 
Martin Feldstein made a strong case for cen-
tral banks achieving not merely low inflation but
no inflation. He recommended the goal should
be to equate the measured rate of inflation to the
bias in the consumer price index and suggested
the United States achieve the goal in the next
four years. He discussed the economic gains
from pursuing such a policy and explained why
he felt policies that accepted higher inflation
were ill advised.
Finally, in looking to the future of monetary
policy in Europe, Jean-Claude Trichet compared
the prospective role of the European Central
Bank (ECB) in pursuing price stability with the
current policy of the Bank of France. Like the
Bank of France, the ECB will operate inde-
pendently under a legal mandate to ensure price
stability. Also like the Bank of France, the ECB
will likely adopt monetary aggregates as inter-
mediate targets of policy. Echoing the com-
ments of many symposium participants, Trichet
emphasized that sound and credible medium-
term and long-term objectives are crucial for
achieving and maintaining price stability. And,
he noted, coping with a changing economy—
and coping with changing perceptions about the
economy—are essential in the analysis and con-
duct of central banking. 
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1 Fischer did not identify a specific index of inflation to be
used as the target of policy. 
2 Summers was not convinced this quality bias needed to
be built into the concept of price stability, at least to the
extent the concept was used as a long-tun target for
monetary policy. He believed the “sticker price” was what
people cared about, not quality-adjusted changes in cost.
3 Fischer cited a recent study by George Akerlof, William
Dickens, and George Perry, “The Macroeconomics of Low
Inflation,” published in the Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, no. 1, pp. 1-59.
4 McCallum made the point that, even if the public’s
learning process was fully understood, the output effects
of a transition period to lower inflation would depend
critically on what was assumed about aggregate
supply—that is, the economy’s “wage-price-output
dynamics.”
5 McCallum distinguished between the use of the term
“opportunistic policy” to refer to regime design and to the
process of transition between regimes. With respect to
regime design, McCallum viewed opportunistic policy as
“very unattractive.”  With respect to transition between
regimes, he said opportunistic policy “might make some
sense, at least on political grounds.”
6 Svensson advocated a slightly different rule. While
Taylor specified a formula for adjusting a policy
instrument—the federal funds rate—Svensson specified a
“target” rule. Specifically, he argued that the central bank
should use a forecast of inflation as its intermediate target
and set its instruments to equate the forecast of inflation to
the long-run target for inflation. Svensson suggested such
a target rule was superior to Taylor’s instrument rule.
7 Jean-Claude Trichet also advocated the use of monetary
aggregates as intermediate targets.
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